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THE 1993 FEDERAL RULES AMENDMENTS AND 
THE MONTANA CIVIL RULES 
Carl Tobias* 
On December 1, 1993, the most comprehensive package of 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal 
Rules) in their half-century history became effective. 1 Although the 
revisions include a number of changes that are relatively innocu-
ous, modifications in Rule 11 governing sanctions and Rule 26 re-
quiring mandatory pre-discovery or automatic disclosure were and 
remain controversial. The amendment to Rule 11 altered the 1983 
revision of that Rule which had proved to be the most controver-
sial amendment ever developed. The amendment to Rule 26 pre-
scribing automatic disclosure was the most controversial formal 
proposal changing the Rules in their history. 
These two modifications, therefore, are quite controversial. 
Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court adopts nearly all of the 
Federal Rules amendments soon after the United States Supreme 
Court promulgates the revisions, and the Montana Advisory Com-
mission on Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure is currently 
considering the advisability of recommending the adoption of the 
1993 modifications. The changes in Federal Rules 11 and 26, ac-
cordingly, warrant analysis to ascertain whether they should apply 
in the Montana state district court system. This essay undertakes 
that effort. 
The paper first briefly examines the developments that led to 
the 1993 amendments in Federal Rules 11 and 26. The essay then 
assesses the changes that the United States Supreme Court insti-
tuted in Rules 11 and 26 and evaluates whether the Federal Rules 
amendments should be incorporated into the Montana Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE 1993 AMENDMENTS 
The developments that prompted the 1993 amendments to 
Federal Rules 11 and 26 deserve relatively terse treatment in this 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Jeff Renz and Peggy San-
ner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this 
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am especially grateful to Ann 
and Tom Boone for their generous gift recognizing scholarship's value. Errors that remain 
are mine. 
1. See Supreme Court of the U.S., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Forms, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402 (1993) [hereinafter Amendments]. 
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essay, as they have been comprehensively considered elsewhere.2 
After examining the 1993 alteration of the 1983 revision of Federal 
Rule 11, this essay discusses the 1993 change in Federal Rule 26 
that imposed automatic disclosure. 
A. Federal Rule 11 
The Supreme Court amended Rule 11in1983 as one of several 
revisions that were intended to address the litigation explosion and 
litigation abuse. 3 The Justices adopted the Rule 11 amendment, 
although the Court had minimal empirical data on either the liti-
gation explosion or litigation abuse or on the operation of Rule 11, 
which had remained unchanged since its inclusion in the original 
1938 Rules:' 
In 1991, the federal Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 
(Advisory Committee) published a preliminary draft proposal to 
revise the 1983 version.11 Nearly all affected parties were critical of 
it. For example, resource-poor parties opposed the proposal's im-
position of a continuing duty to withdraw small parts of papers 
when they have lost merit, while the litigants were concerned 
about the possibility that courts could levy substantial monetary 
sanctions for Rule violations.6 Defense counsel correspondingly 
criticized the Advisory Committee's inclusion of denials as compo-
nents of pleadings that must conform to Rule 11 and the reduced 
prospect of recovering attorneys' fees when the provision is contra-
vened.7 Ambiguous terminology employed in the draft troubled 
many attorneys and litigants who are involved in federal court ac-
tions. 8 There was much criticism of the preliminary draft, although 
2. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to 
Reform, 27 GA. L. REv. 1 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revi-
sion of Rule 11, 77 lowA L. REV. 1775 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: 
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). 
3. See FED. R. C1v. P. 7, 11, 16, 26, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). See generally 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984). 
4. See, e.g., Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 455-59 (1993); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of 
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 
(1989). 
5. See Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted 
in 137 F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. 
6. See Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 236, 237; see also 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 
475, 484-86 (1991). 
7. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 237. 
8. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft, supra note 5, at 75-76 (ambiguous nature of descrip-
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the Advisory Committee comprehensively evaluated the 1983 revi-
sion, sought and thoroughly analyzed many written and oral sug-
gestions of the public before recommending revision, and devel-
oped a draft proposal that it thought would be responsive to all 
interests affected.9 
The Advisory Committee eventually wrote several additional 
drafts of the amendment after soliciting and reviewing more public 
input; reexamining and reworking numerous features of the pre-
liminary draft; and attempting to assemble the clearest, fairest, 
most effective revision possible.10 The Advisory Committee's ef-
forts in crafting the final proposal to revise Rule 11 approximated 
the kind of open, responsive rule amendment process that Con-
gress contemplated in recently changing the national rule revision 
procedures.11 
Despite the important improvements in the proposed amend-
ment and the Advisory Committee's concerted efforts, a number of 
individuals and interests continued to criticize the modifications 
suggested.12 The preeminent opponent was Justice Antonin Scalia, 
who dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of revised 
Rule 11.13 He argued that the change would eliminate a "necessary 
deterrent to frivolous litigation" by affording judges discretion to 
impose sanctions, by disfavoring reimbursement for litigation ex-
penses, and by providing safe harbors. 14 Although members of 
Congress introduced legislation that would have postponed the re-
vision's effective date for one year, Congress seriously considered 
none of the bills, and the amendment to Rule 11 became effective 
on December 1, 1993.111 
tion of specific conduct alleged to violate Rule 11 in provision for giving notice of violation). 
See also Tobias, supra note 6, at 238; V airo, supra note 6, at 495-500. 
9. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 861-65 (1992). 
10. See Amendments, supra note 1, at 420-24. 
11. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, 
102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (Supp. 1990)). See generally Har-
old S. Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules 
Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987). 
12. I rely substantially in this paragraph and the next on Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revi-
sion of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 4 (forthcoming 1994). 
13. See Supreme Court of the U.S., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Forms, Dissenting Statement, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 507-10 (1993) [herein-
after Dissenting Statement]. Justice Clarence Thomas joined this dissent. 
14. See Dissenting Statement, supra note 13, at 507-09. 
15. See S. 2979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993). See generally Randall Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies: New Discovery Rules 
Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3, 40. 
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B. Federal Rule 26 
The Advisory Committee issued a 1991 preliminary draft pro-
posal that could have significantly changed discovery, even though 
there had been little experimentation with, or assessment of, the 
automatic disclosure concept.18 The proposal would have man-
dated that plaintiffs and defendants disclose, prior to discovery, 
information that was "likely to bear significantly on any claim or 
defense.m7 
No formal proposal to amend the Federal Rules has prompted 
such sharp criticism from so many users of the federal courts. 18 In 
February 1992, the Advisory Committee responded to this public 
opposition by jettisoning the disclosure proposal in seeming defer-
ence to experimentation with the mechanism in a number of fed-
eral districts under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).19 
During April of that year, however, the Advisory Committee re-
vived the proposal by requiring that parties disclose "discoverable 
information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in 
the pleadings."20 Advisory Committee members defended their de-
cision by arguing that discovery was not working, that lawyers' 
self-interest precluded constructive change, and that withdrawal of 
the disclosure proposal would have delayed judicially-controlled 
reform for the remainder of the decade. 21 
The rest of the rule revision entities-the Standing Commit-
tee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court-approved 
the Advisory Committee's new draft. The Supreme Court trans-
mitted the amendment to Congress, although Justice Scalia dis-
sented, claiming that the revision "adds a further layer of discov-
ery [and] does not fit comfortably within the American judicial 
system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts 
16. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 5, at 87. 
17. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 5, at 87-88. See also infra note 20 and accompa-
nying text. 
18. See Dissenting Statement, supra note 13, at 512; accord Bell et al., supra note 2; 
Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share: Judges Back Radical Discovery Rule, but Lawyers 
Want a Veto from Hill, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, at 1. 
19. See Bell et al., supra note 2; Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 263, 268 (1992); Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L 
L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1, 12-13. Experimentation must proceed for at least three years, and 
the Judicial Conference is to evaluate it and report to Congress on the experimentation by 
late 1995. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5097 (1990). 
20. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 431-32 (1993); see also Bell et 
al., supra note 2, at 35-39. But cf. Winter, supra note 19, at 269 (revised proposal responsive 
to critics' legitimate concerns). 
21. See Pelham, supra note 18; Samborn, supra note 19. 
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before a neutral decisionmaker. "22 
Most elements of the organized bar and numerous additional 
interests attempted to persuade Congress to reject the disclosure 
amendment. 23 Legislation that would have postponed application 
of disclosure easily passed the House of Representatives in Novem-
ber 1993, but the Senate failed to consider the bill, and the amend-
ment took effect on December 1.24 The revision permits all ninety-
four federal districts to modify or reject the Federal Rule revision, 
and numerous courts, including the Montana District, have done 
so.211 
II. ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE FEDERAL RULES AMENDMENTS 
SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE MONTANA RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
A. Rule 11 
I believe that the 1993 amendment to Rule 11 substantially 
improves the 1983 revision, is much clearer and fairer than the Ad-
visory Committee's preliminary draft, and represents a workable 
compromise. 26 For example, the new version significantly decreases 
incentives for invoking the provision by prescribing safe harbors 
and by trusting sanctioning to judges' discretion.27 The Advisory 
Committee correspondingly deleted several burdensome strictures 
from the preliminary draft, such as the continuing duty.28 The rule 
revision entities instituted these changes, notwithstanding linger-
22. Dissenting Statement, supra note 13, at 510-11. 
23. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 
STAN. L. REV. No. 6 (forthcoming 1994). 
24. See 139 CONG. REC. H8,747 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993); see also Samborn, supra note 
15. 
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l), 146 F.R.D. at 431-32; see also Letter from Paul G. 
Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Mont., to Members of the Federal Bar 
(Jan. 25, 1994) (advising bar that court has temporarily modified automatic disclosure provi-
sion prescribed in April 1992 civil justice plan to conform more closely with federal amend-
ment). See generally Tobias, supra note 23. 
Arizona is the only state of which I am aware that has prescribed automatic disclosure. 
See Symposium: Mandating Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to 
Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 AR1z. ST. L.J. 1 
(1993). Alaska and Maryland have considered disclosure. See Letter from Robert D. Myers, 
Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, to Carl Tobias (Apr. 27, 
1994) (on file with author); proposed Mo. R. C1v. P. 2-403, 20 Md. Reg., Issue 8 (Apr. 16, 
1993). 
26. I rely substantially here on Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 45 
FLA. L. REV. No. 5 (forthcoming 1994). 
27. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23. See also Tobias, supra 
note 2, at 1783-88; supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
28. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 866-71; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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ing concerns about deterring frivolous litigation which Justice 
Scalia so clearly articulated. 29 
The revisors employed wording, such as "nonfrivolous" and 
"appropriate sanctions," that will inevitably foster inconsistent in-
terpretation and satellite litigation. so The rule revision entities also 
kept some incentives for filing Rule 11 motions. For instance, the 
new rule permits judges to award litigants who successfully invoke 
the amendment the expense of so doing and to impose assessments 
of attorneys' fees in certain circumstances.s1 
One factor that deserves serious consideration in deciding 
whether Montana should adopt the federal revision is the value of 
having intrastate consistency between Federal and Montana Rule 
11. Montana has adopted, often verbatim, most of the federal 
Rules amendments rather soon after their promulgation at the fed-
eral level. Some states, known as "replica" states, have modelled 
their state rules on the federal analogues. s2 Indeed, the Arizona 
state courts have even instituted proposed federal amendments 
before they took effect in the federal system, in the apparent belief 
that it was pref er able to be uniform than to be correct. ss 
Another consideration that probably should be important is 
how Montana Rule 11 has operated. Although less formal activity 
has apparently occurred under the state rule than federal Rule 11, 
it remains unclear precisely how much and what type of informal 
activity, such as threats to invoke the rule, have occurred.s' More-
over, much of the most detrimental activity relating to the 1983 
amendment to Federal Rule 11 involved its informal use. s11 The 
Montana rule's interpretation and application by the Montana Su-
preme Court and district courts have not been completely consis-
tent, and considerable satellite litigation involving the provision 
has occurred. ss 
The Montana Supreme Court may also want to take into ac-
count the ways that other states have treated Rule 11. Some states 
had amended their equivalents of the 1983 federal provision before 
29. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a)-(b), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 419-24. Terms such as 
"appropriate sanctions," however, may be the clearest, fairest phrasing that can be used. 
31. See FED. R. Ctv. P. (ll)(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 1783-88. 
32. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A 
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986). 
33. See John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2059 (1989). 
34. Cynthia Ford, Unraveling Rule 11, MONT. LAW. 3, 4-6 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Un-
raveling]; Cynthia Ford, MoNT. LAW., Rule 11 Is Working Well in Montana 9 (Feb. 1993). 
35. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 861. 
36. See Ford, Unraveling, supra note 34. 
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that version was revised. 87 A small number of states never promul-
gated provisions analogous to the 1983 amendment of federal Rule 
11 because they apparently believed that the 1983 revision's disad-
vantages outweighed its benefits. 88 
The questions that seem essential to deciding about the fed-
eral amendment's adoption are whether the enhanced clarity and 
reduced incentives to invoke that provision outweigh the potential 
loss in terms of deterring frivolous litigation. Additional, but less 
important, issues are the somewhat limited formal activity under 
Montana Rule 11 and uncertainty about the exact quantity and 
nature of informal activity. In the final analysis, the increased clar-
ity of the federal amendment and the provision's reduced incen-
tives for its invocation mean that the Montana Supreme Court 
should adopt the federal amendment. 
B. Rule 26 
Several factors complicate the question of whether the Mon-
tana state courts should adopt the federal Rule 26 disclosure 
amendment. One is the difficulty of conclusively determining 
whether any of the automatic disclosure mechanisms will be effec-
tive and, if so, which will be most efficacious. Few of the approxi-
mately twenty districts that have been testing disclosure for the 
greatest period have relied on measures like the federal revision, 
because the courts premised their disclosure schemes on the Advi-
sory Committee's preliminary draft.89 Even these districts have not 
experimented with or evaluated the technique long enough to 
glean definitive conclusions about its effectiveness;'0 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some Early Implementation 
District Courts (EIDCs) that have tested disclosure have exper-
ienced few problems implementing it. •1 Disclosure seems to func-
tion well in comparatively routine, simple litigation or when the 
37. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11; WASH. SuP. CT. Civ. R. 11. 
38. This is true of Massachusetts and New York. See MASS. CIV. R. 11; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. 
L. & R. 2105, 3020 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1994); see also Mn. R. 1-311. 
39. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 143-
45 (1993); see also supra note 17. 
40. Most of the Early Implementation District Courts under the CJRA only instituted 
disclosure during 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated its efficacy. See Tobias, supra 
note 39, at 144-45; Samborn, supra note 19, at 12. 
41. These include the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, 
Massachusetts, and Montana. This evidence is based on conversations with many individu-
als, including advisory group reporters and members, court personnel, and practitioners, 
who are knowledgeable about civil justice reform in those districts. See also Samborn, supra 
note 19, at 12. See generally supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure is quite general."2 Unfortunately, discovery presents the 
most significant complications and demands the most efficacious 
reform in complex litigation, such as civil rights class actions and 
products liability cases, and when parties need relatively specific 
information. 43 
Other anecdotal information indicates that lawyers are less 
critical of automatic disclosure once they have become familiar 
with the procedure."" Many attorneys seemingly have discovered 
that disclosure primarily requires counsel and their clients to par-
ticipate in some activities, particularly document retrieval and la-
belling, earlier in lawsuits.411 
The Montana Supreme Court could treat automatic disclosure 
in several ways. A cautious approach would be to await more defin-
itive results from the experimentation with the concept that is now 
proceeding in a majority of the federal districts. A study of CJRA 
experimentation in the pilot districts being conducted by the Rand 
Corporation is scheduled for completion in mid 1995,46 and that 
report should afford valuable insights on disclosure. For instance, 
the experimentation and its assessment should provide a better 
sense of the precise meaning of the federal rule's phrasing, of 
whether disclosure adds another layer of discovery, and of whether 
disclosure poses ethical problems for counsel. 
A less cautious, but moderate, course of action would be to 
institute an experimental program in the Montana state court sys-
tem. For example, the Montana Supreme Court might designate 
three districts to experiment in certain types of cases for several 
years with disclosure procedures that have proved most promising 
at the federal level. 47 The model employed by most of the EIDCs"8 
and the new federal amendment are valuable starting points, while 
information regarding application could be derived from annual as-
sessments that districts have compiled under the CJRA."9 
42. These assertions are based on the conversations supra note 41. See also Carl To-
bias, More on Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 363 (1993). 
43. These claims are based on the conversations supra note 41. Accord Bell et al., 
supra note 2, at 39-42; Winter, supra note 19, at 268. 
44. See supra note 41; see also Samborn, supra note 19. 
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
46. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, § 105(c), 28 U.S.C. 471 notes (Supp. IV 
1992). 
47. See Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 
GA. L. REV. 665, 666-71 (1993); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Advisory Group of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 6-8 (June 1993); Report on the Impact of the Cost 
and Delay Reduction Plan adopted by the United States District Court for the Southern 
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A more dramatic approach would be the amendment of Mon-
tana Rule 26 to require automatic disclosure. One difficulty with 
this manner of proceeding is that it remains unclear which proce-
dure is now preferable. Another problem is that all judges, lawyers, 
and cases will have been unnecessarily subjected to a failed experi-
ment should the procedure adopted prove ineffective. If the Mon-
tana Supreme Court follows this general approach, it probably 
should employ a provision analogous to that applied in the Mon-
tana Federal District Court.50 This would afford the benefits of fa-
miliarity for federal court practitioners and of having a current as-
sessment of the procedure's efficacy.51 
In the final analysis, the dearth of available information about 
how automatic disclosure actually works in practice and about 
which disclosure procedure is most effective means that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court should probably wait for the results of experi-
mentation that is ongoing in numerous federal districts. If the 
court believes that an urgent need exists for discovery reform 
which disclosure could fulfill, it may want to prescribe experimen-
tation with the concept. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1993 Federal Rules amendments are very ambitious. 
Whether the Montana Supreme Court should adopt their most 
controversial provisions relating to Rule 11 and Rule 26 remains 
unclear. This essay sets out numerous relevant factors that the 
court should consider. Montana Rule 11 probably warrants revi-
sion. Nonetheless, rather limited formal activity involving the rule, 
the time and energy that must be devoted to amendment, the loss 
of some deterrent effect that the 1983 version of Rule 11 appar-
ently had, and the slight risk that revision might fail to improve 
the provision could justify maintaining the status quo. The advisa-
bility of changing Rule 26 to impose automatic disclosure is even 
less clear. Too little information about the procedure currently ex-
ists to make definitive judgments about its efficacy. Awaiting the 
results of experimentation in the federal districts, therefore, may 
be appropriate, although the Montana Supreme Court may want to 
consider providing for limited experimentation. 
District of Texas 13-17 (Apr. 6, 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. IV 1992) (periodic 
district court assessment). 
50. See supra note 25. 
51. See U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mont., Annual Assessment (July 1994). 
